The heart of this paper is a model of social interaction in which players use costumes and other visible consumption goods as signals about the identity of other players. If these signals are informative enough, players use them to condition their social interaction. Importantly, accurate signals are mutually beneficial. This game is then wrapped in another in which players choose their costumes. There are many equilibria in this expanded game, some of which allow individuals to perfectly signal their type in all social interactions, and others of which do not.
Introduction
For the most part, the economist's vision of the individual is founded on the notion of private consumption goods. For example, if asked to think about two women sitting down to have lunch together, most economists would think of the relationship between each woman and her food as a purely private one; in the economist's eye, what one woman has for lunch has no bearing on the other's well being. Garlic aside, this is a sensible working hypothesis for many sorts of consumer choices.
There is, however, another sort of choice for which the fiction of private consumption goods is definitely not sensible. For example, when one of those curious fellows from the City of London puts on his bowler hat and grabs his black umbrella, he is at least as concerned about the image he is projecting to other people (i.e. what they make of him) as he is about keeping his head warm and dry. Similarly, when you look at yourself in the mirror--when buying a new suit or getting dressed for a job interview, for example--your behavior reflects more a concern for the image you project than a purely private relationship between you and your clothes. Engagement and wedding rings provide more obvious examples of goods that are worn primarily for the image they project.
In all of these cases, the contribution of advertising is private. Failure to reach a potential customer may lose a sale. But it has no impact on sales to others. In our analysis, utility functions are independent, but individuals interact in social situations. Information as to type is valuable in these social interactions, hence individuals attempt to signal their type by their choices of costumes. This, of course, generates interdependent demands for the costumes that are used as signals. We show that through image advertising firms often can and will engineer a signaling equilibrium. Interestingly, an image advertising campaign that does not reach most of the consumers in the relevant market will fail to create an accepted image, and hence will have minimal impact on demand for the advertised good.
In Section II we outline a two-stage game of social interaction: in stage 1, each player chooses a costume; subsequently, in stage 2, players meet in random, pairwise encounters in which they use costumes as clues about the underlying characteristics of other players. We close this section with a discussion of the nasty coordination problem that bedevils this game. In Section III we show how image advertising can solve this coordination problem. In Section IV we close with a brief discussion of some of the stylized facts of image advertising in the context of our theory.
In common usage, the terms "image" and "image advertising" are slippery concepts, more easily illustrated than defined. In contrast, in our model they are perfectly well defined. Giving these slippery concepts precise meaning is, we believe, one contribution of this paper.
II. The Game of Dress-Up
In this section we explore a two stage game in which players choose costumes in the first stage, and engage in a series of random, pairwise, anonymous encounters in the second stage.
Naturally, the costumes bought in the first stage may serve as type signals in the encounters that occur in the second stage. We begin by describing the encounter game. Then we find equilibrium actions for a typical encounter, taking the known frequency distribution of player types over costumes as given.
Building on these results, we step back to the first stage in which players choose costumes to find the equilibria of the entire two stage game. There are three distinct sorts of equilibrium, and many equilibria of each sort --hence a difficult coordination problem. The heart of our paper is Section III, where we examine the possibility that image advertising is successful because it helps to solve this coordination problem.
II.1 Payoffs for an Encounter
For lack of a better term we call the players in an encounter partners. Since encounters are anonymous and arise through random matches of two players, in an encounter a player's partner may be any of T possible types. For a player of type i whose partner is a player of type j, there is a unique best action which we call the appropriate action and which we denote by
The first element of player i's payoff, x ij , can be thought of as the baseline payoff for a player of type i in an encounter with a player of type j. The second and third elements, v and w, capture the type communication aspects of the game that are the focus of this paper. Notice that player i's action determines v, while player j's action determines w. We assume that y>z>0 and that g>h>0. Then, as regards both her own action and the action of her partner, player i prefers an appropriate action to a neutral action, and a neutral action to an inappropriate action.
In Table 1 we illustrate the row player's payoff in an encounter in which the row player is type 2, the column player is type 3, and T = 3. The baseline payoff x 23 has no behavioral significance since this payoff occurs in each cell of the payoff matrix. In other words, the communication aspects of the game determine payoffs that are incremental to x 23 . Notice that for each player there are just three payoff relevant actions since any action is either appropriate, inappropriate, or neutral. The largest possible payoff occurs when both players choose the action that is appropriate, given their partner's type. And the lowest possible payoff occurs when both players choose an action that is inappropriate, given their partner's type. If both players choose neutral actions, they are both better off than if they both choose inappropriate actions (since z + h > 0), but they are worse off than if they choose appropriate actions (since z + h < y + g). It is useful to represent the payoff structure for an encounter more compactly by focusing on payoff relevant actions, and by suppressing the baseline payoff. Table 2 gives the row player's payoff in terms of the three payoff relevant actions for an encounter in which the player types are arbitrary. In each cell, the first payoff element is determined by the row player's action and the second by the column player's action. 
II.2 Equilibrium Strategies for an Encounter
In an encounter both players observe their partner's costume before they choose an action, so it is possible for a player to use the partner's costume as a type signal. We want to know when a player will regard the partner's costume as a type signal. More precisely, we want to know when a player of type i will choose an action from the set A i of type specific actions in preference to the neutral action N i .
Define P(t,c) as the relative frequency (or proportion) of players wearing costume c who are type t, and suppose that all players know this frequency distribution. In choosing an action the player faces the following dilemma. Since encounters are anonymous, the partner's type is not directly observable. But the frequency distribution of costumes over types permits the player to form subjective probabilities regarding the partner's type. If the player chooses an action from the set of type specific actions, the action may be appropriate or it may be inappropriate. Then, since the player prefers to take an appropriate action as opposed to a neutral action, and a neutral action as opposed to an inappropriate action, the player will choose a type specific action only if the subjective probability that the chosen type specific action is appropriate is sufficiently high.
Let Ω (c) denote the most frequent player type wearing costume c, and Φ (c) the relative frequency of player type Φ (c). Clearly,
Then, if player i's partner is wearing costume c, the best action from the set A i of type specific
( Ω . This action will be appropriate with probability Φ (c) and it will be inappropriate with probability 1-Φ (c). 
Whether u is equal to g, h, or 0 is determined by the partner's action: it is g if the partner's action is appropriate, h if it is neutral, and 0 if it is inappropriate. The inequality reduces to
Hence, in any encounter, player i has a dominant strategy:
(ii) otherwise take action N i .
Recall that both y and z are positive, and that y (the incremental payoff to player i if player i chooses the appropriate type specific action) exceeds z (the incremental payoff to player i if player i chooses the neutral action). Hence, 0 < z/y < 1.
The dominant strategy result is intuitive. Given that the partner wears costume c, if the subjective probability that the partner is of type Ω (c) is large enough, the player will choose action i c A )
( Ω , but if the subjective probability is too small, the player will choose the neutral action N i .
II.3 The Coordination Problem
The fundamental coordination problem in dress-up arises from the fact that all players are better off if, in stage 1, they manage to coordinate their choices of costumes in such a way that each costume is worn only by players of the same type. When they achieve this sort of coordination --perfect coordination --costumes serve as perfect type signals, and all players get the maximum possible payoff in all encounters. The trouble is that there are as many ways of achieving perfect coordination as there are ways of assigning player types to costumes, and no director of costuming to prescribe a solution.
To be more precise, it is useful to look at the subgame perfect equilibria of the game in which players simultaneously choose their costumes in stage 1, and then engage is random pairwise encounters in stage 2, knowing the frequency distribution of costumes over types that is generated in stage 1. We assume that there are at least as many costumes as player types.
Corresponding to each possible frequency distribution generated in stage 1, there is a stage 2 subgame. From above we know the equilibrium strategies for these subgames. Then, to identify the subgame perfect equilibria of the entire two stage game, we need to identify the frequency distributions such that no player regrets her choice of costume in stage 1, given that players implement the associated equilibrium strategies in all stage 2 subgames.
At the one extreme are all the equilibria in which all players perfectly signal their type. Suppose in stage 1 that player choices of costumes are such that Φ (c) = 1 for all costumes c that are purchased. Then in all stage 2 encounters, both players know with certainty the type of the other player, and choose the appropriate action for their partner's type. Since this generates the highest possible payoff in all encounters for all players, no player regrets her choice of costume in stage 1. There are, obviously, many perfect signaling equilibria.
In a perfect signaling equilibrium the costumes have a signaling value, in addition to any inherent use value (assumed to be identical for all costumes) they might have. Consider a player of type i. Relative to a costume for which i c ≠ Ω ) ( , any costume for which Ω (c) = i gives the player a payoff in each encounter that is larger by amount g, since the former costume elicits an inappropriate action in all encounters while the later elicits an appropriate action. Notice too that player i does not capture all the gains that arise when she chooses a costume for which Ω (c) = i in preference to one for which i c ≠ Ω ) ( , since all the partners she encounters in stage 2 are better off by y.
At the other extreme are all the equilibria that involve no (effective) type signaling. Holding the configuration of stage 2 encounters fixed, any of the perfect signaling equilibria
Pareto-dominates any of mixed equilibria, and any of the mixed equilibria Pareto-dominates any of the non-signaling equilibria.
In the game as specified, the coordination problem is overwhelming. Except by chance, the players will not arrive at any equilibrium, let alone a perfect signaling equilibrium. In the next section we see how image advertising might achieve imperfect coordination in a suitably expanded game. In a closely related paper, Arifovic and Eaton (1998) use the genetic algorithm in a framework in which dress-up is played repeatedly to explore the possibility that learning may lead to a perfect signaling equilibrium.
III. Image Advertising
In that it involves both senders and receivers, image building is like any other form of Fundamentally, an image advertising campaign attempts to associate an image with a product, to write a new entry in the dictionary of images. "People who display product A are projecting image I." More succinctly, "Product A is associated with image I." Like any other advertising campaign, the image campaign must communicate with potential buyers of the image product.
That is, the image campaign must communicate the intended product/image association to targeted buyers -a group of people who want to project image I and will therefore buy product A, if they can be convinced that this association is accepted by their targeted audience. But this means that the image campaign must also convince the targeted buyers that the targeted audience has also received and accepted the intended association. At a minimum, this would seem to require that the image advertising campaign actually communicate the intended product/image association to the targeted audience. That is, unlike other advertising campaigns, to be effective the image campaign must communicate with a group that is broader than group of targeted buyers. As we see it, the need to communicate with both potential buyers and with the audience with whom these buyers want to communicate -the need to establish a common vocabulary of
images -is what distinguishes image advertising from other forms of advertising.
This feature of imaging advertising has two immediate implications. First, image advertising will be broadly pitched, to a group that includes both targeted buyers and their targeted audience.
Second, given that a successful campaign must convince the targeted buyers that a substantial portion of the targeted audience has also received and accepted the intended product/image association, to be successful an image advertising campaign must also be massive. In other words, quantity demanded is a non-concave function of expenditure on image advertising. To be more precise, and to explore related aspects of image advertising, we extend the game of dressup to include image advertising. It should be clear, however, that these two features of images advertising are quite general.
III.1 The Image Advertising Model
We need a little more notation. Let n i (i = 1, T) denote the number of players of type
the total number of players, p i (=n i /n) the proportion of all players who are type i, and M the total number of products. We assume that all players know n i (i = 1,T) and M. Since players are atomless, we can interpret n i and n as real numbers. In contrast, M is an integer.
In the context of dress-up, the images to be associated with costumes are player types. We will think of the advertiser as trying to create the association of costume c and player type i by broadcasting the following message: "All players of type i who receive this message will buy costume c, and all players of types other than i who receive this message will not buy costume
c."
Targeted buyers are the n i players of type i, and the their targeted audience is the entire group of n players, since players of type i interact with the whole population.
The technology of advertising is captured by the following function: We assume also that the technology of message sending is such that anyone who receives the message can infer i c Λ . This important assumption is not entirely unrealistic. Anyone who receives a message broadcast in conjunction with a telecast of the Super Bowl, for example, can be sure that something like 150 million other viewers also got the message. Similarly, elaborate and expensively produced TV ads assure the viewer that the advertiser intends to reach a large audience --the more elaborate and expensive the ad, the larger the intended audience. It is also possible for an individual to make inferences regarding the coverage of a campaign from the number of times the individual is exposed to a particular ad, or series of ads. What is crucial for our story is that people who receive image messages are able to make inferences regarding the number of other people who also received the message. It is, we believe, realistic to suppose that people can and do make such inferences. To facilitate analysis, we assume that these inferences are perfectly accurate, which is, of course, quite unrealistic.
It is convenient to assume that p i is large relative to 1/M for all player types. Image advertising is definitely not attractive in our model unless this restriction is satisfied for at least one player type --to see this, notice that any costume that managed to establish a universally accepted image of type i is trading a market share of 1/M for a market share of p i . As a matter of convenience, we will assume that the restriction is satisfied for all player types. Specifically, we assume that p i > 1/(M -1).
For simplicity we want to assure that in their stage 2 encounters players respond to costumes that have not been advertised with a neutral action. A sufficient condition is that none of the relative player frequencies in the group of players for which there has been no attempt to establish an image costume be greater than z/y. This will be true if the number of advertised costumes is small and if, for all player types i, p i is small enough relative to z/y.
Since we want to focus on image advertising, we suppose that the prices of all costumes are identical (and larger than marginal cost of producing a costume). In addition, we assume that each player will buy one costume for reasons that are unrelated to dress-up. A costume then has an inherent value to a player, and possibly a value as a type signal. The value as a type signal can be positive or negative, depending on whether the image associated with the costume is the player's own type or some other type. For each player, one costume, which we call the inherently preferred costume, has an inherent value that is marginally larger than the inherent value of all other costumes. The inherently preferred costumes of all player types are uniformly distributed over the M costumes. However, the margin of preference for the inherently preferred costume is so small that a player will always choose an inherently non-preferred costume that serves as an accurate type signal to an inherently preferred costume that does not, and will choose an inherently non-preferred costume that does not serve as a type signal to an inherently preferred costume that serves as an inaccurate type signal.
III.2 One Image Advertising Campaign
Now let us look at the case in which there is just one image campaign. Specifically, suppose that, just before players buy their costumes in stage 1 of dress-up, the firm that produces costume c spends i c E to create an association of costume c with player type i.
The players who do not receive the advertiser's message are easy to model. Since they have no way of coordinating their actions, they will buy their inherently preferred costumes, their purchases will be uniformly distributed over the M available costumes, and they will choose the neutral action in all stage 2 encounters.
As regards the players who receive the advertiser's message, some additional terminology is useful. We will call these players messaged players, and we will speak of the messaged players as accepting or rejecting the advertiser's intended image in stage 1 of dress-up, and of validating or failing to validate the intended image in their stage 2 encounters. When we say that the messaged players accept the advertiser's intended image in stage 1, we mean that messaged players of type i buy costume c, that messaged players of types other than i whose inherently preferred costume is c randomly choose among costumes other than c, and that all other messaged players buy their inherently preferred costume. And when we say that the messaged players reject the advertiser's intended image in stage 1, we mean that they buy their inherently preferred costumes. When we say that the messaged players validate the intended image in their stage 2 encounters, we mean that if their partner in any encounter is wearing costume c they choose the type specific action that is appropriate for a partner of type i, and when their partner is wearing a costume other than c they respond with a neutral action. And when we say that the messaged players fail to validate the intended image in stage 2 encounters, we mean that they choose the neutral action in all encounters regardless of the costume worn by their partner.
We want to answer two closely related questions. In stage 1 of dress-up, will the messaged players accept the intended image? In stage 2 encounters, will the messaged players validate the intended image?
Notice first that, in stage 1, a messaged player will accept the intended image if it is anticipated that in stage 2 encounters messaged players will validate the image. To see this, suppose messaged players do anticipate validation. Then, by accepting the image in stage 1, a messaged player of type i elicits an appropriate (as opposed to a neutral) action in all encounters with other messaged players, and messaged players of types other than i elicit a neutral (as opposed to an inappropriate) action in their encounters with other messaged players.
So, to answer these two questions, we will suppose that the image is accepted in stage 1, and ask whether it will be validated in stage 2 encounters. Using the dominant strategy result from Section II.2, we know that a messaged player's decision to validate the advertiser's intended image depends on the subjective probability that a player wearing costume c is of type i. Only if the subjective probability is large enough ( ≥ z/y) will the messaged player respond to costume c with a type specific action appropriate for a player of type i. Given the assumptions we have made, we can calculate that probability. That is, supposing that the intended image is accepted in stage 1, we can determine the circumstances in which it will be validated in stage 2.
A messaged player who makes the provisional assumption that the intended image is accepted in stage 1 will reason as follows. Unmessaged players will choose their inherently preferred costumes in stage 1, and their choices will be uniformly distributed over the M available costumes. This is true even if they are sophisticated enough to infer that some firm has an incentive to try to establish an image for its costume. The expected number of unmessaged players is (1 - response is preferred to a neutral, and since the choice of costume has no effect on the actions of unmessaged partners, beliefs (B.1) lead a messaged player of type i to buy costume c. Now consider a messaged player of type other than i. She will anticipate an inappropriate response in all encounters with other messaged players if she buys costume c and a neutral response if she buys any other costume. Since a neutral response is preferred to an inappropriate response, and since the choice of costume has no effect on the actions of unmessaged partners, beliefs (B.1) lead a messaged player of type other than i to buy a costume other than c. Thus part (i) of (B.1) is also confirmed.
The following beliefs are also self-confirming when
randomly choose without replacement the programs they watch, the technology will be random and independent. It is not at all clear which of these extreme assumptions regarding the technology of messages is more realistic. We choose to work with a perfectly ordered technology because it is more tractable. Figure 1 illustrates the proposed partition of the ) , (
space. Λ and Λ′ are implicitly defined by the following equations:
From equation (5) we propose that both images will be accepted. The equilibrium in which all messaged players accept one of the images and reject the other gives messaged players a larger expected payoff, but there is no way they can coordinate their choices. Hence, the equilibrium in which both images are accepted, which for messaged players Pareto-dominates the equilibrium in which both images are rejected, seems salient. The supporting beliefs are easily constructed.
IV. Discussion
As we see it, the following are the important features of our theory of image advertising. First, the target group for an image campaign is necessarily larger that the group of intended buyers of the good, for the target group includes as well the target audience of the intended buyers --the group of people with whom the buyers want to communicate through their purchase and use of the image good. Second, to be effective, an image campaign must convince some of the intended buyers that a substantial portion of their target audience have received and understood the good's intended image; hence, a little bit of image advertising is bound to be ineffective. Successful image campaigns are massive. Third, if two or more goods attempt to establish the same image, the advertising campaigns will achieve virtual saturation of the target group.
Consistent with all three features,, image advertising campaigns are frequently associated with very wide coverage. Moreover, discussions with media practitioners suggest that firms are willing to pay a premium to assure that image ads are coordinated and reach large groups of consumers simultaneously. Thus, they may be willing to pay high up front rates for advance purchase of TV, air time, or print media to assure that slots for image ads are locked in, even though rates for spot advertising based on current availability are significantly lower.
Saturation aspects of image advertising are also evident in the projection of images far beyond immediate purchasers of a good. One well publicized example is the recent controversial "Old Joe" campaign for Camel cigarettes launched in 1988, which critics claim was aimed at youths Pierce et al. 1991) . In 1990 about 26% of the U.S. population over 18 smoked. Reported use of cigarettes by youths 12 to 18 was about 12% (National Center for Health Statistics 1992).
Among smokers, Camels market share has historically been modest, although growing recently (under 5% of smoking adults in 1986; 8.1 % of teenage smokers in a 1989 survey) (Centers for Disease Control 1991 Control , 1992 . Nevertheless, a 1991 survey of high school students in selected states indicated that over 97% had seen "Old Joe" and 93% knew the Camel brand. The analogous figures for adults were 72% and 57% (DiFranza et al. 1991) . Thus, although a minority of the population smoked at all and only a tiny fraction of the population smoked Camels, the "Old Joe" campaign reached virtually all of the youths surveyed and a majority of
